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OPINIONS 
Turkey says no 
There were good reasons why the United States was 
unable to persuade Turkey to host U.S. troops headed 
for Iraq. By I'v1ustafa Kibaroglu 
N THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE CONFLICT IN 
Iraq, the United States and Turkey held ex-
tensive negotiations over the U.S. use of 
Turkish territory in aid of the U.S. campaign. 
Many Americans assumed that Turkey 
would quickly agree to any U.S. proposal, and the 
Turkish government that was formed after last 
year's November 3 elections was harshly criticized 
both in and out of the country for "deliberately" 
drawing out the negotiations with the United 
States, its most important strategic partner. 
The negotiations were conducted along three 
tracks: political, economic, and military. The Turk-
ish government wanted to prevent the emergence of 
an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, to 
which the United States responded affirmatively. 
Negotiations on the military track concerned where 
Turkish troops could be deployed and how many 
would cross the border into northern Iraq without 
simultaneously disrupting U.S. military operations 
against Baghdad. Finally, on the economic track, 
negotiations were aimed at compensating Turkey 
for the economic damage a U.S.-led campaign 
against Iraq would cause. An understanding was re-
portedly reached on the political and military tracks. 
But negotiations on the economic track never came 
to fruition, even though there was a great deal of 
speculation about a $6 billion deal, which would 
have been much welcomed in Turkey's financial, 
commercial, and industrial sectors. 
Time was probably the most precious asset for 
both the Turks and the Americans. Turkey was in 
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need of hard currency, having suffered two severe 
debt crises in the past two years. The United States 
was concerned about conducting a military cam-
paign in the increasing heat of the Iraqi desert. 
"Hysteria" might be the word to describe the state 
of affairs in Ankara in the days leading up to the 
Iraqi conflict, and there was probably some of the 
same feeling in the air on Capitol Hill. 
Washington's attitude was expressed in political 
cartoon caricatures of all things Turkish that ap-
peared in the U.S. media, including the New York 
Times and weekly magazines like Time and 
Newsweek. Some have held that these humiliating 
caricatures were responsible for the reversal of the 
attitude of most deputies of the AK Party, which 
held a two-thirds majority in the Grand National 
Assembly, and who had tabled the basing resolu-
tion before the parliamentarians-and who ulti-
mately blockaded the way to the U.S. troop deploy-
ment in Turkey. That would be a very simplistic 
assessment, however, of why Turkey turned down 
the U.S. request to use a combination of military 
bases and air and sea ports, in return for which a 
number of financial benefits would have flowed 
from Washington to Ankara. 
The essence of disagreement 
The seeds of the no vote were actually planted in 
March 1991, with the creation of the "safe havens" 
that allowed the return of the hundreds of thou-
sands of Iraqi Kurds who had fled their country 
and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran. The Kurds 
feared being gassed by Saddam's air force, in a re-
peat of the massacre at Halabja in March 19~8, in 
which 5,000 men, women, and children were 
killed. The so-called no-fly zones, established by the 
United States-one above the 36th parallel in the 
Iraqi north, the other below the 32nd (later the 
33rd) parallel in the Shiite south-were considered 
by many Turks as a first step in a long-term U.S. 
plan to create an independent Kurdish state. Never-
theless, in 1991 permission was granted by the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly for U.S. aircraft 
to use Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey, to en-
force the no-fly zone, and that permission had been 
renewed every six months since. 
Whenever the United States was accused of using 
the zone to help create a Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq, U.S. officials and their representatives in 
Ankara dismissed Turkish concerns by saying that 
U.S. authorities had no such intentions, and that 
they were observing Iraq's territorial integrity. 
But Turkish military circles and many of their 
like-minded political followers were very suspi-
cious. The military, in particular, witnessed the 
close coordination of U.S. Special Forces and other 
U.S. agents and the Iraqi Kurdish militia through-
out the 1990s. For instance, thousands of Iraqi 
Kurds went through a special training program on 
Guam where they learned, among other things, the 
fundamentals of administering a state bureaucracy, 
including the military. 
This caused deep resentment in the Turkish mili-
tary. One former Chief of Military Staff, Dogan 
Giires, recalled in a live tv8 interview that he had 
sometimes given orders to check the engines of U.S. 
helicopters stationed on Turkish soil (and therefore 
subject to certain restrictions), to see if they were 
hot, an indication that they had been carrying out 
missions that did not have the approval of Turkish 
authorities. 
Similarly, former Prime Minister Biilend Ecevit 
told CNN Tiirk that he "had sincere doubts about 
the real intentions of the Americans with regard to 
the Kurds in Iraq." 
But if Turkey had not trusted the Americans on 
the Kurdish issue since 1991, one may reasonably 
ask why the National Assembly didn't rescind its 
approval of the no-fly arrangements, first known as 
"Operation Provide Comfort I and 11," and later as 
"Operation Northern Watch." As a result of these 
operations, an independent Kurdish political entity 
appeared in northern Iraq, becoming over the years 
a de facto state, with a parliament, ministries, a bu-
reaucracy, a central bank, and its own currency. 
There were two reasons for continuing to permit 
the use of Turkish bases for these operations. One 
was the fear of a new wave of refugees from Iraq. 
The second, and maybe more compelling reason, 
was the implicit approval by successive U.S. admin-
istrations of Turkey's sporadic but large-scale cross-
border incursions into northern Iraq throughout the 
1990s. These operations involved tens of thousands 
of troops accompanied by air power, in pursuit of 
Turkey's Kurdish separatists, the PKK terrorists. 
The establishment of the no-fly zone had also 
turned northern Iraq into a sanctuary for the PKK, 
which had been waging a separatist war against 
Turkey since 1984. Turkey's incursions were much 
criticized in European circles, but the United States 
turned a blind eye. 
Strained relations 
Against this background, it would be naive to argue 
that negotiations on the economic track, which 
were said to deadlock on the amount as well as the 
method of payment of U.S. aid, determined the fate 
of the resolution that would pave the way for bas-
ing American troops in Turkey. 
The deadlock was political. There were public ru-
mors about secret U.S. plans for a Kurdish state, 
and Zalmay Khalilzad, President George W. Bush's 
special representative, shuttled between Ankara and 
northern Iraq in search of a breakthrough. But he 
could not satisfy Turkish concerns; his Turkish 
counterparts insisted that the Turks (or Turko-
mans) in Iraq be included in Iraq's future political 
restructuring. A political role for the Turkomans 
was seen as a safety valve-a way to protect 
Turkey's vital interest in northern Iraq, by means of 
which efforts to create a Kurdish state could be ren-
dered ineffective. 
Turkish policy-makers maintained that Iraq's 
Turkomans had always been oppressed, whether 
they lived in Saddam's Iraq (squeezed in between the 
two no-fly zones), or in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish ne-
gotiators wanted a political settlement that would 
enable the Turkomans to be represented in the "new 
Iraq" commensurate with their population, which 
was estimated to be roughly 2.5 million-more than 
double the official figure, which was suspect. But 
the Kurds were not about to agree to a deal that 
would elevate the Turkomans to an almost equal 
status with themselves in the northern provinces, 
which they claimed to be "unarguably Kurdish." 
The non-inclusion of the Turkomans in the meet-
ing of Iraqi opposition groups in the northern city 
of Sulaimaniya-which took place on March 1, by 
coincidence the very day the National Assembly 
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voted on the basing resolution, reinforced the 
doubts of many deputies. The vote was 264, yes; 
250, no; with 19 abstaining. However, the resolu-
tion required the approval of an absolute majority. 
Before the vote 
There were mass anti-war demonstrations in 
Turkey, as elsewhere, mostly near mosques and 
universities. From extreme left to extreme right, 
public opinion was against allowing the United 
States to deploy troops in Turkey. Nearly every or-
ganization opposed the U.S.-led campaign against 
lraq-especially the "Islamists," who were mainly 
constituents of the ruling AK Party. How could the 
party, they asked, assist in a Christian "crusade," as 
President Bush had been unlucky enough to call it 
in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 
against the Muslim Iraqis? 
Yet right before the final vote, the climate among 
decision-makers seemed to favor U.S. plans to de-
ploy troops in the country. It was believed by the 
Turkish security elite that the "three-track-deal 
package" with the United States was the best that 
could be worked out. By opening its territory to 
U.S. troops, Turkey would become an active mem-
ber of the "coalition of the willing" and have a seat 
at the table around which the future of Iraq would 
be shaped. Turkey would have the leverage to pre-
vent any development that would lead to an inde-
pendent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey 
would also have a voice in securing proper repre-
sentation for the Turkomans. In addition, the $6 
billion deal, together with other credits, would 
boost the economy. And the removal of Saddam 
and the dismantlement of his weapons would add 
to Turkey's security. 
A shock wave 
The failure of the basing resolution was unforeseen. 
In the hours after the vote, on the one side, masses 
of people cheered, chanted, and celebrated the dis-
missal of the resolution, some even comparing the 
vote to Ataturk's defeat of the occupying powers 
after World War I. In the aftermath, the loss of the 
$6 billion deal caused few regrets; it was not con-
sidered significant compared to the scale of the 
Turkish economy. As for the Kurdish groups' re-
pugnant war-time behavior in Kirkuk and Mosul, it 
was soon halted with the arrival of U.S. troops. 
And Turkey could not have prevented it, anyway. 
The failed agreement would have allowed Turkey 
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to deploy troops only 20 kilometers into Iraqi terri-
tory, but those two cities were more than 100 kilo-
meters away. 
On the other side of the spectrum were those 
who were deeply pessimistic about future relations 
with the United States. They had welcomed the eco-
nomic package. Their first reaction was that the 
U.S. administration would never forgive the Turks 
and would punish Turkey by obstructing the flow 
of credits from the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. They argued that the disap-
proval of the resolution was the worst decision in 
the 80-year history of the Turkish Republic. Not 
only would the stock market hit rock bottom the 
next day, but also, they said, currency rates would 
skyrocket overnight, as a result of which an econo-
my that was already in intensive care would be se-
verely damaged and might even collapse. Besides, 
they asserted, Turkey would no longer be able to 
prevent the proclamation of a Kurdish state, which 
would eventually make territorial claims on 
Turkey's southeastern Anatolian districts. So far, 
none of these things have happened, nor are they 
likely to happen in the foreseeable future. 
Turkish-American relations 
During the war, President Bush remarked at one 
point that he "told the Turks not to send troops 
into northern Iraq." No other recent U.S. president 
would have used such language; his predecessors 
would have been careful to say "we advised our 
Turkish allies" or "our Turkish friends." But the 
remark reflected perhaps the stress of conducting a 
war that had not made a good start, at least in the 
public eye, rather than a persistent attitude. 
As for lasting consequences, the military-strategic 
significance of Turkey seems likely to be dimin-
ished. Iraq will become the forward defense post of 
the United States for future contingencies in the 
greater Middle East and a launch pad for power 
projection in Central Asia, if need be. The United 
States will maintain large numbers of troops in 
Iraqi territory for some time to come, and military 
bases will operate on long-term contracts, all of 
which will undermine the indispensability of Incir-
lik and other military installations in Turkey. 
Still, U.S. strategists will no doubt bear in mind 
that the greatest challenge to U.S. security will come 
from the threat posed by international terrorism. 
And no military capability-no matter how great-
can prevent or deter acts of terrorism. The most im-
portant instrument will be reliable intelligence. At 
that point, Turkey will be seen again as an invalu-
able partner, given its location, cultural, religious, 
and linguistic common denominators with other 
civilizations in the Eurasian landscape, as well as its 
centuries-old expertise in military affairs, including 
intelligence-gathering capabilities. 
The U.S. attitude toward the United Nations and 
toward NATO was much criticized throughout the 
Iraqi crisis, yet it seems likely that the United States 
may prefer, in the future, to form ad hoc alliances 
rather than maintain static and regional alliances. If 
so, the United States may have to more frequently 
enter into lengthy negotiations, as it did with 
Turkey. 
In the future, Turkish-American relations will 
be determined by the scope and content of emerg-
ing U.S. policies and Turkey's capability and will-
ingness to collaborate on particular policies as 
they develop. By the same token, the economic in-
centives that the United States had used as sweet-
eners in achieving its politico-military goals may 
also be considerably affected. ~ 
Kashmir, caught in the middle 
India and Pakistan will try once more to work it out. 
The other options are not so good. By Sumit Ganguly 
N THE EARLY HOURS OF MARCH 24, A GROUP 
of armed men dressed in Indian Army fa-
tigues entered the mountain village of Nadi-
marg, in Indian-controlled Kashmir. They 
ordered the village's Hindu inhabitants out 
of their houses, and then shot those who complied, 
24 of 52 villagers, including several women and 
children. The attack was only the latest in a series 
of massacres of innocent civilians, especially Hin-
dus, since the eruption of an ethno-religious insur-
gency in Kashmir in 1989. 
Five decades after the collapse of the British colo-
nial empire in South Asia, the Indo-Pakistani dis-
pute over Kashmir continues to wrack the region, 
exacting a depressing toll in lost lives. Kashmir is at 
the center of a seemingly unrelenting and bitter in-
terstate dispute between India and Pakistan. 
The dispute took a sanguinary turn in 1989 after 
India made a series of clumsy attempts to meld 
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Kashmir into the Indian union, by means both fair 
and foul. Once the violence began, Pakistan entered 
the fray and the uprising was transformed from a 
spontaneous and disorganized movement of disaf-
fected Kashmiris to a well-orchestrated infiltration 
of Pakistani-trained terrorists. Although some of 
the insurgents genuinely believe that predominant-
ly Muslim Kashmir is oppressed by Indian rule, 
they have failed to command the sympathies of 
much of Kashmir's populace, Muslim or otherwise. 
Yet the insurgency drags on. And should it be-
come the focal point of yet another war between 
India and Pakistan, might that war involve nuclear 
weapons? Or might the United States play a useful 
role in seeking a resolution to this crisis? 
These questions are hardly trivial. More than 
50,000 people have perished in Kashmir since the 
onset of the insurgency-more than were killed in 
all four Indo-Pakistani wars combined. 
Slouching toward war 
India and Pakistan nearly went to war for a fifth 
time last year. The catalytic event was the Decem-
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